This year's Eid al-Fitr break was a long one. A joint decree of three ministers set 21 and 22 March 2026 as public holidays and 20, 23 and 24 March 2026 as collective leave (Mutiarasari, 2025). For plants that reduced load or shut down part of their units over the break, late March and early April were the time to bring them back.
On the morning of 2 April 2026, fire was seen at the oven furnace area of a plywood mill in Karanganyar, Central Java, before the plant had fully resumed operation. No one was killed, and the exact cause was still under investigation (Radio Republik Indonesia [RRI], 2026). We draw no conclusion about that event. Its timing is simply a reminder that bringing equipment back into service carries risks unlike those of daily operation, and this article explains one method for managing them: the operational readiness review (ORR).
Why Startups Bite
According to the Center for Chemical Process Safety, as cited in a CSB safety digest, process safety incidents occur five times more often during startup than during normal operation, and a 2010 refining study found that half of process safety incidents occur during startups, shutdowns and other infrequent activities (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board [CSB], 2018). The reason is that these periods are full of non-routine procedures and unusual situations.
One case in that digest occurred at Pascagoula, United States, in 2002. A distillation column had been shut down for five weeks and was thought to be isolated in standby, yet about 1,200 gallons of mononitrotoluene remained inside and kept being heated by steam leaking through manual valves. A runaway reaction followed, and the explosion injured three workers (CSB, 2018).
The Center for Chemical Process Safety [CCPS] (2025) stresses that even equipment idle for a few hours can present hazards, because many systems are no longer in their normal position. The findings that come up most often before startup are drains or bleeders left open, motors turning the wrong way, instruments still in bypass and procedures that no longer match the equipment.
PSSR Versus ORR
The two reviews are often confused. Under US process safety regulation, a pre-startup safety review (PSSR) is required for new facilities and for facilities modified significantly, and it must confirm that construction matches design, procedures are in place and adequate, hazard analysis or management of change requirements are met, and operator training is complete before hazardous chemicals are introduced (Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA], 1992). An ORR is carried out whenever equipment is restored to service, including when nothing has been modified (CCPS, 2025).
That is where the gap lies. A restart after a holiday usually involves no modification, so it never triggers a PSSR, even though the equipment has changed state while it stood idle.
Readiness Review Steps
- Map the state of every unit when it was left: running, standby, isolated or drained. Repair work done during the break is logged separately because it belongs to management of change and PSSR, not the ORR.
- Walk the plant with a unit-specific checklist: valve and blind positions, drains and vents, energy isolation locks and tags, locking pins, and instruments or interlocks that must not be left in bypass.
- Test utilities and emergency systems before process units: power, instrument air, boiler feed water, fuel, alarms, detectors and fire pumps.
- Prepare people: a startup procedure briefing, a refresher for operators just back from leave, and support from experienced staff. The CSB (2018) also recommends shift policies that limit fatigue during special periods.
- Set hold points. The person in charge signs only after every item is verified, and incomplete items go to a supervisor before hazardous materials or fuel are introduced (CCPS, 2025).
Field Examples
CCPS (2025) describes a unit due to start up after a hydrotest on a superheater coil. Nothing had been modified, but one procedural step to remove the locking pins on spring hangers was missed, so the coil could not expand as it heated. An operator heard unusual noise and the startup was stopped. An ORR should have found those pins before heating began.
A local example comes from a case study at an Indonesian refinery. Most critical equipment had been inspected and declared ready, yet a leak on the boiler feed water line and a failed natural gas pressure control valve only came to light during startup and delayed the process. The researchers recommended a more thorough checklist and closer monitoring and follow-up of problems during startup (Sainyakit et al., 2024).
Where It Stops
An ORR does not replace management of change and a PSSR when equipment, materials or procedures have changed. Its quality depends on the checklist and on honest sign-off; a generic list copied from another unit can easily miss unit-specific hazards, such as material left in a column as at Pascagoula. Nor does it replace a hazard analysis that explicitly covers startup and shutdown modes. In our view, an ORR works best when it is built from the unit's own HAZOP and incident history and revised after every use.
How Nusa Safety Helps
Nusa Safety helps process companies build readiness checklists, startup procedures and hold points through its process safety management review, HAZOP and LOPA studies that also examine startup and shutdown modes, and SOP and technical guideline development.
This article is general information, not legal or professional advice for any specific case.
References
- Center for Chemical Process Safety. (2025, June). Operational readiness reviews [Indonesian edition: Tinjauan kesiapan operasional]. Process Safety Beacon. American Institute of Chemical Engineers. https://ccps.aiche.org/sites/default/files/ccps-beacon/2025/6/202506beaconindonesian.pdf
- Mutiarasari, K. A. (2025, September 20). Tanggal cuti bersama Lebaran 2026, cek jadwalnya! [Lebaran 2026 collective leave dates]. detikNews. https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8121956/tanggal-cuti-bersama-lebaran-2026-cek-jadwalnya
- Occupational Safety and Health Administration. (1992). Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-29/subtitle-B/chapter-XVII/part-1910/subpart-H/section-1910.119
- Radio Republik Indonesia. (2026, April 2). Pabrik plywood di Popongan terbakar, Damkar Karanganyar kerahkan tiga unit armada [Plywood factory in Popongan on fire, Karanganyar fire service deploys three units]. RRI. https://rri.co.id/surakarta/regional/2306857/pabrik-plywood-di-popongan-terbakar-damkar-karanganyar-kerahkan-tiga-unit-armada
- Sainyakit, R., Nugroho, B. S., Sriana, T., & Adhytama, V. P. (2024). Implementation of PSSR as a constituent of PSM to enhance occupational safety. Indonesian Research Journal on Education, 4(4). https://doi.org/10.31004/irje.v4i4.1297
- U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. (2018). Safety digest: CSB investigations of incidents during startups and shutdowns. https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/17/csb_start_shut_02.pdf
